Richard Dawkins

Richard Dawkins is in my news feed again, for saying "date rape may be better than stranger rape, but that is not an endorsement of date rape."

This is basically what is getting him in the most trouble. First, my response: it is not at all clear that date rape is better or worse than stranger rape, at least to my internal ethical compass. He acknowledges this in one of his responses, saying "maybe you think the other thing is true, that date rape is traumatizing and stranger rape is more acceptable because you don't subsequently have to interact with the stranger." So basically shame on him for trying to make a logical argument about "It is possible to say X is better than Y without endorsing X" and then using such a terrible example.

That said, I empathize with Dawkins in many ways for precisely the behavior of telling people the unfiltered truth and then suffering the unintended consequences of having them misrepresent your point. I think many scientists would empathize with such a scenario, only that with Dawkins this is true on quite a grand scale.


Some years ago probably in late 2007, expat and rick had an extensive discussion about Richard Dawkins which was unfortunately lost when Wikisocion crashed (if anyone knows where it is, I would love to see it). At the time I was a stupid kid and did not know anything about Dawkins so I was not involved. Initially expat saw Dawkins as LSE, rick saw Dawkins as ILE, and they somehow ended up meeting in the middle and settling on ESE. I did read the comments in the discussion before it was lost, and I remember never really understanding the ESE typing.

Some of Rick's initial observations are preserved in this forum thread. Some observations include that Dawkins is highly conceptual (although in another work relied heavily on providing examples), and rarely tells personal stories. Unfortunately the videos linked here are also broken.


My view of Richard Dawkins is somewhat more broad, trying to decipher the focus he might have by summarily examining his work over a period of years and his reactions to public reception of his work.

In a sentence or two: "Dawkins is a highly public figure who has tirelessly and for years told people the truth, in an unfiltered and apparently unpleasant way. In doing so he has demonstrated an extraordinary propensity to repeatedly say the wrong thing, use awkward examples, have large numbers of people misunderstand his comments, and basically piss off lots of people. But his failures in doing so seem to have made him only more prickly."

Dawkins sees himself as a modest defender who is "passionate about" reason, rationality, science, atheism, the challenging of cultural taboos and the freedom of open discussion of ideas. This is to say nothing of his followers who are sometimes accused of worshiping scientific reason as gospel (which by definition it is not). But I think this has little to do with Dawkins, who appears mostly to be committed to the goals of rationality.

One thing that I think is interesting in Dawkins' propensity to say the wrong thing is his lack of sense of subtlety (and relatedly I'm not sure I agree with Rick's observation that Dawkins explains the "main concept" well, although to be fair that observation is years old). As in the "rape is rape" controversy, Dawkins focuses himself entirely on explaining that he was illustrating merely a logical concept, and that we should not be afraid of making logical statements about rape just because it is a sensitive subject. All of which are well and good (and true and worth saying!) but it is incomprehensible to me how Dawkins does not take painstaking care to point out and frame that this is his point. Instead he defends his example as a fair example, whereas in truth it was a terrible example and does nothing but confuse his audience.

Neil DeGrasse Tyson has an interesting clip of interacting with Dawkins at some scientists forum, in which he criticizes Dawkins for failing to live up to his potential in "persuasion." (This clip also doubles as an example, albeit very minor, of Dawkins sharing a personal anecdote in contrast to Rick's observation in 2007 that he never does this). Dawkins "gratefully accepts the rebuke" here, but his response and perhaps his conduct outside of this discussion seem to suggest that effective persuasion is not really his point of focus. Dawkins' lone-wolf, barbed style stands out compared to Tyson, who has discussed extensively the art and importance of preparing science for public consumption. I have been inclined to interpret Dawkins' apparent disinterest in persuasion as a disinterest in extroverted ethics; instead he prefers to tell the truth regardless of how barbed it may seem and how many people misconstrue him. Yet he is also conflicted, involved in but not committed to persuasion in political and religious spheres, while really perhaps being more interested in science and research.


All of this information considered (and if you disagree with my summary or observations please feel free to comment and tell me why!), I have a great deal of difficulty seeing Dawkins as ESE, the "compromise" type reached by rick and expat some time ago. ESEs are not particularly apathetic to persuasion nor are they typically in the public sphere as prickly as Dawkins. Nor is Dawkins' obviously outwardly very warm, animated, etc. (although Rick made observations to this effect in his defense of Dawkins which wikisocion ate, but I never understood them).

I think Dawkins' behavior is best explained by thinking of him as LSE, expat's original suggestion. The idea of plainly "telling the truth" without great regard for its reception is consistent with an extroverted logical moral compass and, developmentally, I think that Dawkins' rhetoric and prickliness has increased over time with his fatigue -- that is, he is quite personable in many ways and his "edge" is somewhat a defensive response to the vitriol he receives. Yet he maintains a more publically influential presence than I would expect from Te creatives. The defensiveness of the freedom of ideas and attachment to rationalism is also perhaps an extension of "stubborn" estimative extroverted intuition (although I agree this interpretation may be a little twisted).

If not LSE, I might see Dawkins as LIE -- another type that can be prone to heavily moralizing but that is not as conflicted and withdrawn about being in the public eye. I do not have strong arguments against this typing. But I am inclined to read Dawkins' lack of subtlety, use of confusing metaphors, and generally his overstatement of the "danger" faced by freethinking rationalists, as somewhat shallow "hunch" evidence against this. I would expect an LIE to verbalize their doubts and the contradictory, confusing points of their arguments more fully than I have seen in Dawkins, and to see themselves less as participants responsible for taking a role in the society around them. Whereas Dawkins is somewhat more conflicted in this sense.

Some other typings -- maybe LII with a sore spot instead of super-ego spot in the arena of public interaction, persuasion, and emotional approachability -- might also merit consideration. But that typing has other issues. Overall LSE is not without issues either but it is the best fit that I have interpreted yet.


I encourage anyone with a competing view -- especially if you concretely disagree with my observations and can provide alternative evidence -- to comment.